Caleb Soldani Security Portfolio

Cybersecurity portfolio

Caleb Soldani

Cybersecurity student and IT support professional. These five projects show how I segment networks, harden systems, assess vulnerabilities, and plan incident response, with the evidence from each lab.

B.S. Cybersecurity · SNHU · Nov 2026 CompTIA Security+ (SY0-701) · in progress 4+ yrs technical & banking support
Email: calebsoldani@gmail.com LinkedIn profile Valdosta, GA
CYB 310 · Network DefenseApril 2026Hands-on lab

Network Segmentation and Firewall Redesign

A small office ran every department on one flat network, with servers mixed in among user PCs. I rebuilt it into isolated segments behind an edge firewall, and in a separate assessment audited an Active Directory domain and traced a connectivity failure.

What I did

  • Redesigned the topology in GNS3 around a backbone switch, a core router for user departments, and a dedicated server router.
  • Assigned each department its own VLAN: Customer Experience on VLAN 2, HR on VLAN 3, and the web and authentication servers on VLAN 4.
  • Wrote OPNsense WAN rules that allow only HTTP and HTTPS to the web server at 192.168.4.2 and block those ports to every other host, ordered for first-match evaluation.
  • Ran net accounts on a domain controller and found a 7-character minimum password, a 42-day maximum age, and no account lockout.
  • Traced an inter-subnet outage: hosts reached their own gateway, and the router's interfaces and routing table were correct, which pointed to a filtering rule blocking traffic after routing.
#ActionDestinationPortPurpose
1Allow192.168.4.280HTTP to web server
2Allow192.168.4.2443HTTPS to web server
3Blockany80HTTP to every other system
4Blockany443HTTPS to every other system
GNS3 topology: Internet to Edge_Firewall to Backbone_Switch, which feeds CoreRouter (HR_Switch with 3 PCs, CustExp_Switch with 6 PCs) and ServerRouter (Server_Switch with AuthServer and WebServer)
Fig. 1Reconfigured topology in GNS3, with the server zone on its own router.
OPNsense rule list showing two allow rules to 192.168.4.2 on ports 80 and 443 and two block rules for the same ports to any destination
Fig. 2The four WAN rules as configured in OPNsense.
GNS3 switch configuration with ports 0 through 7 assigned to VLAN 2 in access mode
Fig. 3Customer Experience switch ports assigned to VLAN 2.
Command Prompt output of net accounts showing minimum password length 7 and lockout threshold Never
Fig. 4Domain password policy audit with net accounts.
VyOS router output of show interfaces and show ip route listing connected subnets 192.168.10.0/24, 192.168.20.0/24 and 192.168.30.0/24
Fig. 5Router interfaces and routes confirmed valid while troubleshooting.

Result

Departments can no longer reach each other or the servers directly, and only the web server is exposed to the internet. For the domain, I recommended a 12 to 14 character minimum, complexity and history requirements, and lockout after five failed attempts.

GNS3OPNsenseVLANsVyOSActive DirectoryGroup Policyping
CYB 300 · System and Communication SecurityFebruary 2026Hands-on lab

Linux Hardening Script and Certificate Authority

Relocated systems needed the same baseline security settings applied quickly and consistently. I automated the baseline in one Bash script and built a root certificate authority so systems could be issued trusted certificates.

What I did

  • Wrote a single executable Bash script on Ubuntu 22.04 that sets the hostname and time zone, exports running processes, sets a 3-minute idle lock, and exports the last 50 syslog entries to a security log.
  • Verified every change from the terminal after the script ran.
  • Generated an AES-256 encrypted 4096-bit private key with OpenSSL and created a self-signed root certificate with SHA-256, valid for one year.
  • Documented how certificate signing requests flow from a host to the CA and back.
#!/bin/bash

# 1. Rename computer
sudo hostnamectl set-hostname C_Soldani
# 2. Change time zone
sudo timedatectl set-timezone America/Denver
# 3. Get running processes
ps aux > running_processes.txt
# 4. Set screensaver lock to 3 minutes
gsettings set org.gnome.desktop.session idle-delay 180
# 5. Export last 50 syslog entries
sudo tail -n 50 /var/log/syslog > SecurityLog_Soldani.txt
hardening.sh open in the nano editor
Fig. 6The script in nano on the lab VM.
Terminal running openssl genrsa -aes256 -out ca.key 4096 and openssl req -x509 -new -nodes -key ca.key -sha256 -days 365
Fig. 7Creating the CA key and root certificate in OpenSSL.

Result

One command applies a repeatable baseline to any relocated system, which removes manual setup errors and gives auditors a record of exactly which controls were applied.

BashUbuntu 22.04OpenSSLPKIVMware
CYB 400 · Security Assessment and AuditingJune 2026Analysis

Vulnerability Assessment and Remediation Plan

A network vulnerability scan returned findings ranging from critical remote code execution to low-risk information leaks. I sorted them into a phased remediation plan by severity and by how quickly each could realistically be fixed.

FindingCVSSPhaseRemediation
SMB brute-force logins with default guest credentials (5 instances)9.0Scheduled maintenanceDisable or reset default accounts, enforce NIST SP 800-63B passwords, restrict SMB with host firewalls
Cleartext transmission of sensitive data over HTTP—Policy updateRequire TLS 1.2 or 1.3 and an HSTS policy
DCE/RPC and MSRPC service enumeration—Policy updateBlock port 135 and dynamic RPC ports at the perimeter, restrict internally
Microsoft Windows SMB Server NTLM vulnerabilities (MS10-012)10.0Longer-termTest and deploy the MS10-012 patch, enforce NTLMv2 by Group Policy in the meantime, rescan
SSL/TLS weak cipher suites4.3Longer-termDisable RC4, DES, and 3DES, prefer ECDHE with AES-256, retire SSL 3.0 and TLS 1.0/1.1

Result

I recommended fixing the default SMB credentials first. They score 9.0, need no patching or downtime, and can be closed in a single maintenance window, which shuts the easiest entry points while the harder patches are tested.

CVSSNIST SP 800-63BTLS hardeningGroup Policy
CYB 320 · Incident Response and InvestigationAugust 2026Response plan

Ransomware Incident Response Plan

A finance workstation displayed a ransom note and users could not open shared financial files. Two departments that were meant to be segmented were not, and backups ran only monthly. I wrote the response and recovery plan following NIST SP 800-61.

  1. ContainDisconnect the infected workstation from the network without powering it off, to preserve volatile evidence. Disable its user account and mapped drives.
  2. ScopeSweep endpoints for the same encryption behavior, starting with the departments that were not actually segmented.
  3. Protect backupsConfirm the local backup was not reached, then disconnect it or make it read-only.
  4. RecoverIdentify the strain and check No More Ransom for a free decryptor; otherwise restore from backup and rebuild infected machines from a clean image.
  5. HardenFix and verify segmentation before reconnecting anything, deploy behavioral endpoint protection, require MFA on remote access, and tighten file share permissions.
  6. Keep the business runningMove payments and payroll to manual workarounds during recovery, and plan a warm site or cloud failover for Finance.
NIST SP 800-61ContainmentBackup strategyBusiness continuity
CYB 420 · Enterprise SecurityOctober 2026Assessment and redesign

Enterprise Security Assessment

A company preparing for federal contracts had open IT closets, hubs on the network, no firewall, and no logging. I assessed it across people, process, and technology and redesigned the network in Packet Tracer, aligned to the NIST Cybersecurity Framework and SP 800-53.

DomainWeakness foundControl added
PeopleUnlocked front door and IT closetsBadge reader, locked closets, reception visitor log
PeopleNo security awareness trainingRequired training with phishing simulations
ProcessNo role-based access or access reviewsAAA on the authentication server, role-based access, quarterly reviews
ProcessNo logging, incident plan, or change controlCentral syslog server, written incident response plan, change approval
TechnologyHubs and a flat network with no firewallSwitches, department VLANs with ACLs, port security, firewall with a DMZ
TechnologyRemote laptops with no encrypted tunnelVPN for remote employees
Packet Tracer diagram showing VLANs 10 through 50, a core switch with inter-VLAN ACL, a firewall with a DMZ holding the web and public records servers, a VPN cloud for remote laptops, locked closets, a badge reader and a visitor log
Fig. 8Redesigned infrastructure in Packet Tracer, with controls labeled.
NIST CSFNIST SP 800-53Packet TracerVLANs and ACLsDMZVPN